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Abstract
Inclusive Fitness Theory (IFT) was proposed half a century ago by W.D. Hamilton to explain 
the emergence and maintenance of cooperation between individuals that allows the existence of
society. Contemporary evolutionary ecology identified several factors that increase inclusive 
fitness, in addition to kin-selection, such as assortation or homophily, and social synergies 
triggered by cooperation. Here we propose an Extend Inclusive Fitness Theory (EIFT) that 
includes in the fitness calculation all direct and indirect benefits an agent obtains by its own 
actions, and through interactions with kin and with genetically unrelated individuals.  This 
formulation focuses on the sustainable cost/benefit threshold ratio of cooperation and on the 
probability of agents sharing mutually compatible memes or genes. This broader description of 
the nature of social dynamics allows to compare the evolution of cooperation among kin and 
non-kin, intra- and inter-specific cooperation, co-evolution, the emergence of symbioses, of 
social synergies, and the emergence of division of labor. EIFT promotes interdisciplinary cross 
fertilization of ideas by allowing to describe the role for division of labor in the emergence of 
social synergies, providing an integrated framework for the study of both, biological evolution 
of social behavior and economic market dynamics. For example, a utility function build on 
EIFT helps understand the appearance of terrorism and might help in eventually combating it.
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Introduction   
The present paper does not pretend to present novel facts nor brand new theory. It aims at 
opening novel windows that allow for fresh views on established knowledge, favoring the flux of 
ideas between areas of science that have developed quite independently from each other. New 
multidisciplinary ways to look at old facts broaden our understanding of nature by helping us 
rethink established dogma in search of Consilience (Wilson 1999). Here I present a summary of a 
life long effort in building such a interdisciplinary window.
The theory of evolution, formulated by Darwin and Wallace some time ago, was built on the 
insight that heredity, natural selection, and variability interacted to produce biological evolution. 
The breakthrough in thinking was not the discovery of natural selection, or of heredity, or diversity. 
All these features were described in detail by Alexander von Humboldt, much cited by Darwin, and 
who lived a generation before Darwin and Wallace (Humboldt died the year Darwin published the 
Origin of Species). Humboldt had a working knowledge of selection and of the importance of the 
survival of the strongest, of heredity and the logic of domestication of plants and animals by 
selective breeding, and was aware about diversity, describing detailed variations between species 
and among species (Humboldt 1807). The important contribution by Wallace and Darwin was the 
insight that evolution emerged from the synergistic interaction of these three features, and that this 
evolutionary dynamics could explain the emergence of species (Top right cycle in Figure 1). That is,
the continuous interaction between heredity, variations produced by mutations and the environment,
and natural selection, produce the evolutionary dynamics that allows species to adapt to their 
environments and eventually diverge in their evolutionary path producing new species. That is, 
natural selection operates through the differential reproduction of individuals, measured as fitness. 
Higher levels of fitness are  achieved by higher rates of reproduction, which in turn may be 
enhanced by higher survival probabilities. This theory, however, had difficulties in explaining many
exceptionally bright colors, ornate plumage and conspicuous forms among living creatures, which 
attract predators and thus decreased the odds of individual survival. To overcome this limitation, 
Darwin introduced the concept of sexual selection to complement that of individual selection to 
explain biological evolution (Bottom right cycle in Figure 1).  Darwin open two conceptually 
different ways at looking at fitness: individual survival that favors the strongest and most able 
individual, and sexual selection that favors the most prolific in mates and descendants. Both 
selecting forces might work synchronously, or they might diverge. Although both, survival and 
reproduction, are parts of the individual's fitness, theory that looks separately at each of the two 
processes help us in gaining a deeper understanding of evolution.
Soon after Darwin, important advances in our understanding about how evolution proceeds 
emerged. Development of population genetics, mainly between 1918 and 1932, and the expansion 
of Mendelian genetics were incorporated together with a more detailed theory of natural selection 
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and gradual evolution into a modern evolutionary synthesis. This modern synthesis, produced 
between 1936 and 1947, reflects the consensus that is still valid today (Haldane 1932, Huxley 1942,
Fisher 1958, Dobzhansky 1970, Mayr 1963, and others). The next important advance was a better 
understanding of cooperation and the emergence of societies that was not explained satisfactorily by
Darwin (1859) and Wallace (1870) nor the just mentioned synthesis (Wilson 2000). Cooperation is 
important in a number of settings, including, behavioral interactions, biological evolution, 
sociobiology, cultural dynamics, and collective intelligence; yet the features allowing it succeed are 
not well known and are still discussed today (Skyrms et al. 2014). Inclusive Fitness Theory (IFT) as
originally stated by Hamilton (1963, 1964), has been the most successful theory so far to provide 
explanations for the evolution of cooperation. Hamilton grasped that the effect of other individuals 
(con-specifics or not) affect the odds of survival of an individual. Specially among social species, 
the action of others could affect the fitness of an individual, so as to form a web of relations that 
affect the fitness of the participating organisms (The top left cycle in Figure 1 represents just one 
cell of such a network). 
Figure 1: Schematic representation of selected aspects or components of the network of relationships 
responsible for the dynamics of natural Selection driving biological evolution. Individual Selection (i) 
represents natural selection acting on the individual; Sexual Selection (s) that acts on mate selection 
strategies and intra-sex competition; and Inclusive Fitness  (o) cycles  represents the coevolutionary effect 
on selection of the action of other organisms. Variation represents genetic mutations and phenotypic 
variations, Reproduction represents the reproductive and life-history strategies of individuals, Mating 
stands for sexual reproduction. Organisms suffer evolution through Individual Selection (bold arrows), which
in turn is affected by at least two other cycles: Sexual Selection and Inclusive Fitness.  Evolution among 
asexuals differs from this description (Jaffe 1996), as no mating's occur.
I
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IFT can be summarized by an expression quantifying the fitness costs of a cooperative 
interaction as  c  <  b . r ; where "c" is the fitness cost to the donor in a cooperative act, "b" the 
benefit to the receiver, and "r"  as the probability that an allele in one individual will also be present 
in a second individual via common descent. This simple formula is often misunderstood. The 
expression "c < b" is a consequence of the law for the conservation of energy, or first law of 
thermodynamics, as applied to biology: in the long term, survival of organisms requires that its total
expenditures must be equal or lower than its total income. In order for fitness to be positive, 
positive survival rates are required.  Hamilton's proposition was to treat "b" as a quantity modulated
by "r". This IFT was often misunderstood, in part to the fact that soon after rejecting Hamilton's 
original paper on IFT submitted to Nature (Segerstrale 2013), Maynard Smith introduced the Kin 
Selection Theory (KST) to explain the phenomena Hamilton described with IFT (Maynard-Smith 
1964). This historical circumstance has obscured the relevance of IFT until today and favored that 
of KST which is much more intuitive and easier to understand. The difference between KST and 
IFT is that the former only considers the genetic relationship between cooperating individuals as 
relevant for calculating fitness, whereas the later accepts that other factors are also relevant.  KST 
simplifies IFT by assuming that "r" in the formula “c  <  b . r”, represents “only” the genetic 
relatedness between donor and receiver. This simplification, though, has become very popular. So 
much so that Google Scholar in April 2015 retrieved about 1.4 more papers using the term “kin 
selection” compared to “inclusive fitness”. Many scholars today still do not distinguishable between
both concepts. (see Gardner et al. 2011, Allen et al. 2013, Corning 2013, for example). This 
confusion between KST and IFT has led  several descriptions of the history of IFT to assign 
Haldane a primary role in it (see for example Hölldobler and Wilson, 2009). Yet, relating Haldane's 
(1932) casual comments on how expanded parental care may be favored by selection, with a 
pioneering role in the development of IFT, is equivalent to calling Alexander von Humboldt the 
grandfather of Darwin's theory of evolution. I argue that the components affecting inclusive fitness 
that are nor related to kin are much more important in explaining evolutionary phenomena, 
including economics, that those considered by KST. The trouble with KST is that it leads people to 
believe that cooperation can only be achieved when considering actions between relatives, whereas 
IFT can also explain cooperative interactions between non-kin.
Substituting IFT with KST was never accepted by Hamilton (Segerstrale 2013), and even 
Maynard Smith (1983) recognized its distinctiveness. IFT is a much more general theoretical 
framework than KST, which is a special aspect of the former. The focus on inclusive fitness rather 
than on kin selection allows for a finer understanding of population genetic dynamics. Inclusive 
fitness being > 0 can be the right criterion for social behavior to be selected, also in models where 
kin selection is absent, and where assortment is brought about by something other than common 
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descent. Inclusive fitness, in addition to the genetic relatedness between the actors in a cooperation, 
takes into account “the likelihood of sharing genes above random levels due to statistical effects in 
genetic population dynamics” (Price 1970). I.e. the effect of co-variance on selection, that also 
determines the degree of assortation that may occurs between organisms (Price 1971). IFT is an 
open theoretical framework, which might conceive as multipliers to “b” any means that increase the
frequency of an allele in a population through social interactions, such as mutualism, synergistic 
cooperation and others (Queller 1985, 1992, 2011). In fact, it is not necessary to refer any more to  
kin-selection. Flecher & Doebeli (2006) wrote: "The most fundamental explanation for how 
altruism (defined by local interactions) increases in a population requires that there be assortment in
the population such that the benefit from others falls sufficiently often to carriers (and at the same 
time nonaltruists are stuck interacting more with each other). Nonadditivity if present can play a 
similar role: when collective cooperation yields synergistic benefits (positive nonadditivity) 
altruistic behaviour can evolve even in the absence of positive assortment, and when there are 
diminishing returns for cooperation (negative nonadditivity) the evolution of altruism is hindered 
(Queller, 1985; Hauert et al., 2006)." 
Independently of the theoretical development just described, robust tools for handling non 
linear emergent phenomena in mathematical biology, such as numerical simulations, reached the 
same conclusions, confirming a central role for social synergy in the evolution of cooperation, 
specially among non-kin groups.  That is, agent based computer simulations studying the 
evolutionary dynamics of inclusive fitness on haploids, diploids, haplo-diploids, asexual and sexual 
organisms showed that social cooperation without social synergy is unable to emerge and sustain 
itself in scenarios for biological evolution (Jaffe 2001) and in scenarios of economic markets (Jaffe 
2002a). These simulation showed that both, biological evolution of social behavior and market 
dynamics, require social synergy for its working. Social synergy is defined here as the process by 
which emergent properties arise through social interactions. For example, cooperation in retrieving 
food by insects allows them to handle food that no single individual would be able to capture and 
retrieve alone, expanding opportunities to exploit novel niches to groups of cooperating foraging 
workers. Such type of cooperation seems to explain the evolution of social behavior among bees 
(Michener 1969) and wasps (Silva & Jaffe 2002).  Social synergy is not reduced to an abstract 
concept as it can be measured quantitatively and empirically in different settings (Jaffe 2010). 
Cooperation were all interacting individuals benefit are also called Mutualism (Axelrod & Hamilton
1981, Bronstein 1994, Hoeksema & Bruna 2000, for example) and can be viewed as a special kind 
of social synergy. 
EIFT is based on Queller’s  version of Hamilton’s rule (Queller 1985), as presented by 
Flecher & Doebeli (2006),  who formulated "r",  the modulator of "b" as a ratio of covariances (cov)
so that: r = cov(GA, P0) / cov(GA, PA)
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where GA measures the genotype or breeding value in each individual in the population (subscript A 
for actor), PA the phenotypic value of each actor (e.g. 0 for defection and 1 for cooperation), and P0 
is the average phenotype of others interacting with each individual actor (subscript O for others).
This formulation implies that the altruistic genotype represented by GA  increases in 
frequency if those with the genotype on average get more benefit from the behavior of others than 
they pay in cost for their own behavior. This relationship uses measures of assortment (covariance) 
between those with this focal genotype and the helping behaviours of others, scaled by the value of 
these behaviors. Taking the covariance over the whole population ensures that if this inequality 
holds for the helping genotype, it cannot simultaneously hold for the alternative nonaltruistic 
genotype. Therefore, when Hamilton’s rule is satisfied, carriers on average have higher direct 
fitness than the population average (For details see Flecher & Doebeli 2006) .
Here I propose a slightly different formulation that facilitates its application to human 
economic dynamics. This expanded theory allows to bridge conceptual divides between biological 
and economic sciences. Very recently, Corning (2013) presented a similar bioconomic approach to 
cooperation giving a preponderant role to synergy in evolution. His approach differs somewhat to 
the one developed here, as it focuses on multi-level and group selection (Corning 2013) and to 
'synergistic selection' in the context of the emergence of complexity (Corning & Szathmáry 2015). 
The present proposition differs in its conception of inclusive fitness but can be viewed as 
complementary to Corning's approach, and is not a substitute for it.
Expanding Inclusive Fitness Theory
A dynamic narrative that includes both biological and cultural evolution requires a few 
semantic modifications in order to formulate an EIFT. The first adaptation is to refer to agents 
instead of organisms. In biology, mating is described as a cooperation between two agents to 
produce offspring; whereas in economics, cooperating agents are productive units which can be 
individuals or aggregates such as companies. Cooperation is at the heart of any business and thus 
the basis of economic dynamics. Using agents as the unit for dynamic studies is getting more 
common in biology, sociology, ecology and economics as shown by the ever increasing literature 
(some examples are: Axelrod 1997, Pepper & Smuts 2000, Bonabeau 2002, Epstein 2006, 
Tesfatsion & Judd 2006, in addition to the literature cited so far). 
Another semantic modification refers to reproduction. Reproduction should be viewed as 
reproduction of information, which includes diffusion and multiplication of information. This 
information can be of the genetic kind in biology, or , in economy it might mean memes (Dawkins 
1989), information attached to productive systems (Hausmann & Hidalgo 2014), or scientific 
knowledge quantifiable with scientific papers (Jaffe et al. 2013b), etc.
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As represented in Figure 1, the fitness of an individual has at least three aspects or 
components: 
1- The selection acting on the survival capabilities of the individual that relate to its capacity to 
manage and respond to its environment (i), 
2- The abilities to mate and reproduce that can be grouped under sexual selection (s),
3- The inclusive fitness or fitness affected by the presence and actions of other individuals with 
which it interacts or which it bestows upon others (o).
The total fitness of an individual (f) is a composite function which includes the fitness 
conferred by the phenotype of the individual, which in turn depends on its individual survival 
capabilities (i) and its reproductive success (s). In addition, f depends on the consequences of 
interactions with others (o), so that: f = f(i, s, o)
The component "o" has at least 3 parts to it. 1- The likelihood that a gene is present in another 
individual due to genetic relatedness or the kin selection component (k), 2- The probability that a 
gene is shared due to assortation (a), 3- The probability that a gene will favor the fitness of another 
due social synergies or economic considerations that emerge from the presence of specific alleles in 
each individual (e).  Therefore: o = f(k, a, e). 
Assortation includes the concepts of kin selection, as preference for cooperating with kin is a 
specific kind of assortation. Thus o = f(a, e). The fitness of the individual f can be summarized as 
the product of two related networks of relationship : fi   or factors affecting individual fitness 
directly; and fo   or factors affecting the individual fitness via the action of others:  
f  =  fi(i, s, fo(a, e)) 
This formulation converges with that supported by Queller (1985, 2011), Flecher & Doebeli (2006) 
and others, in that is treats assortation (a ) and social synergy or non additive benefits ( e) as the 
most important features determining the evolutionary viability of cooperation. Of all these terms, a 
and e are the less well understood and will explained below.
Assortation:
Assortation refers to the fact that similar organism attract each other. This is described in 
phrases such as "birds of one feather flock together" and is also refereed to as homophily: love for 
things similar to oneself; or narcissism: love of oneself. The term assortation was already used by 
Hamilton (1975) and he helped to show its relevance to IFT motivating George R. Price to develop 
a mathematically useful formulation (Price 1971). This paper showed that assortative mating can 
increase the frequency of an allele. This effect was shown to be so fundamental that it also works in 
mate choice in sexual reproduction (Jaffe 2002b). Complementing these findings, computer 
simulations showed that without some kind of assortative mating, sexual reproduction is unlikely to 
emerge among complex diplod organisms. (Jaffe 2001). 
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The working of assortation in favoring the success of cooperative strategies seem to be 
associated with the possibility of forming globular clusters, as is the case of some network 
structures (Kuperman & Risau-Gusman, 2012). Assortation is favored by tags or a green beard 
effect (Hamilton 1964), consisting of signals, behaviors or other features that allow agents to 
discriminate among potential cooperators and regulate the type of agents that will interact 
cooperatively (Riolo et al, 2001; Kim, 2010). A very basic form of cooperation often occurs among 
sexually reproducing mates. But assortation or homopyly evolves in many other cooperative 
interactions (Fu et al. 2012). Many behaviors of modern humans, such as the choice of mates and 
pets, can be explained as a result of assortation. For example humans select mates based on visual 
perception of their faces (Alvarez & Jaffe 2004), or of their pets (Payne & Jaffe 2005), and friends 
(Christakis & Fowler 2014) assortatively. In addition, homophily is very common in social settings 
(Centola et al. 2007, Kossinets & Watts 2009).  Assortation or homophily have particular interesting
effects on the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation, even beyond what can be explained with IFT. 
They reduce error thresholds of mutations (Ochoa & Jaffe 2006), and accelerate the speed of 
evolution (Jaffe 2001), favoring the emergence and maintenance of cooperation (Jaffe 2002b).  
Assortation has been studied extensively in assortative mating and assortative cooperation 
(see review in Jaffe 2002b). Empirical evidence for assortation has been mounting. Here, just few 
random examples: Evidence among vertebrates include studies showing that chimpanzee 
friendships are based on homophily in personality (Massen & Koski 2014); the existence of 
assortative mating in lesser snow geese (Cooke et al. 1976) and in blue tits (Andersson & 
Andersson 1998); assortation among humans in games of experimental economics (Bowles et al 
2005, Hamilton & Taborsky 2005); from anthropological and archaeological studies (Apicella et al. 
2012, Richard & Levin 2005); and of course, from ethology (Alvarez & Jaffe 2004, Payne & Jaffe 
2005).
Social Synergy: 
Much work on cooperation has centered on altruism. Indeed, the ultimate sacrifice of ants 
and bees for the good of their colonies is an impressive feat. But eventually, all sustainable social 
behaviors involve interactions that are beneficial to all intervening parts (Flecher & Doebeli 2006). 
Interactions where all parties gain, the so-called win-win interactions (Figure 2), are very much 
known among economist (Lewicki et al. 1985, Dolfsma & Soete 2006, Liu & Huang 2007). One 
important concept is Social synergy, i.e. non-additive benefits and positive feedback of social 
behavior that affect individual fitness. Social synergy refers to synergies triggered by social 
cooperation that increase economic and other benefits to social individuals favoring its evolution 
(Queller 1992, 2011, Jaffe 2001, 2002, 2010, Taylor 2013). Synergies that emerge from social 
interactions can be quantified (Jaffe 2010, Bettencourt 2013), and are fundamental in explaining the
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maintenance of complex societies (Jaffe 2002a). 
Although not ignored, social synergy has been little studied quantitatively among living 
creatures other than humans (Jaffe 2010). The father of IFT already recognized that several different
mechanisms are needed to explain the prevalence of social cooperation among extant species 
(Hamilton 1996). Studying bees, Michener (1969) demonstrated the existence of several different 
evolutionary routes leading to sophisticated societies that benefited all or most of its members. To 
understand these evolutionary dynamics, economic and ecological considerations are more 
important than genetic ones (Osborn & Jaffe 1997, Silva & Jaffe 2002). 
The economic forces unleashed by human cooperation have been studied by political 
economist for many years (Krotopkin 1902 for example). More recently, Social synergy has been 
mentioned when studying pay off matrices, altruistic punishment, benefits of social life and 
cooperation The cost/benefit ratio of cooperation might reveal the existence of this synergy. 
Cost/benefit ratios have been shown to be important for the evolution of cooperation in different 
settings (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998; 2005; Jaffe, 2002: Nowak, 2006; Baranski et al, 2006; Ohtsuki 
et al, 2006; Jaffe & Zaballa, 2010, Taylor 2013). 
Figure 2: Effect of different cooperative strategies on the fitness of the actors.
In interactions involving exploitation or parasitism, one organisms benefit at the expense of the other, increasing its 
fitness (bigger dark blue faces) and reducing that of the other (small light blue face). In altruistic interaction the reverse 
hold. The altruist reduces its fitness and the other increases it. Interactions where altruists punish individuals not 
complying with social norms, both the altruist and the other reduce their fitness. In synergistic business both actors win,
increasing their fitness, not necessarily by the same amount (Jaffe 2014a).
From where does this synergy that produces win-win situation arises? Economics has an 
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answer to this question. Long ago, among others, Aristotle recognized that division of labor 
enlarges and elicits innate human differences (Aristotle IV BC), which allow the existence of 
complex society. Adam Smith recognized the existence of a special synergy working in the markets 
as an “invisible hand”, but neither he nor others focused on the specific mechanisms that allowed its
working. Adam Smith (1776) writes in The Wealth of Nations "The greatest improvement in the 
productive powers of labor, and the greater part of the skill, dexterity, and judgment with which it is
anywhere directed or applied, seem to have been the effects of the division of labor .... It is the great
multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in consequence of the division of labor, 
which occasions, in a well governed society, that universal opulence which extends itself to the 
lowest ranks of the people". Friedrich Hayek (1949), specially when tackling the "Economic 
Calculus",  and many others (Becker & Murphy 1994 for example), hint to the emergence of 
synergistic effect in social interactions due to the existence of differently specialized actors. 
Division of labor has also been associated with social life in insects and many other animals 
(Wilson 2000) and is correlated with the degree of order in ant societies (Jaffe & Hebling-Beraldo 
1993, Jaffe & Fonck 1994). Thus, a very important source of social synergies in the economic 
dynamics of markets and in biological cooperation is the division of labor. The force behind Adam-
Smith's invisible hand of the market that triggers the complex market dynamics intuitively 
described by Hayek, is social synergy as described here. This can be evidenced using computer 
simulations  (Jaffe 2015) and robot swarms (Ferrante et al. 2015). It is the specialization of labor that 
allows complementary interactions to produce ever stronger synergies that confer non-linear 
economic advantages to societies that allow and foment individual liberty and division of labor 
(Jaffe 2014a). 
Not all social synergies arise from division of labor. Many other mechanisms are possible. 
Economies of scale, for example, also allow the individual to achieve higher fitness or economic 
gains among humans and other animals (Hamilton 1971, Jaffe 2010, Bettencourt 2013). Social 
intelligence can also be viewed as an emergent phenomena (Woolley et al. 2010). Again, economic 
science has explored these issues much more  and/or differently than biology.
Among economists, the existence of non linear dynamics in wealth accumulation has been 
recognized long ago. Karl Marx (1867) for example, when he described the surplus value and 
attempted to balance wealth across a society, recognized that more than simple additive arithmetic’s
was required. More sophisticated thermodynamic approaches to study non-linear dynamics in 
economics were initiated by Georgescu (1970) and developed further by many others (see 
Beinhocker 2006 for example) which eventually lead to a systematic use of the concept synergy in 
economics. Underlying the concept pf social synergy in economics is the fact that some actions and 
the exploitation of some resources is only possible after a certain threshold size of social aggregates 
has been reached, producing a non-linear or emergent effect on wealth aggregation.
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Examples of synergy used to simulate social evolution in biology can easily be applied to 
human economics. The example of two wasp mothers that attend their brood communally, each one 
investing 50% of their time in brood care, achieving to protect their brood 100% of the time, 
reducing the odds of losing their brood to zero with the same cost to parents (Jaffe 2001), can be 
expanded to human societies and institutions in charge of communal security (Zabala & Jaffe 2010).
A simple example of a synergistic view of the relationship between increased utility and 
increased wealth is that if a wealthy donor gives a poor recipient a blanket, the recipient will get a 
much higher utility from the blanket than the donor, but there is no net increase in wealth. But if the
object donated is a sewing machine, which is used in the rich donor's house as decoration, but the 
poor receiver uses it to produce blankets to sell, then there is a net increase in wealth. The first case 
illustrates a synergistic increase in utility, the second type one of wealth. (Libb Thims personal 
communication).
The more we look at synergy in economics and business management, there more we find 
meaningful examples. Examples include: the impact of acquisitions on merging and rival firms 
(Dopfer 1991, Chatterjee 1986), economic development (Evans 1996, Ostrom 1996), mergers and 
acquisitions (Bradley et al 1983, Fun et al 1996, Larsson & Finelstein 1999), and evidence that 
certain type of competition over personal resources can favor contribution to shared resources in 
human groups (Barker et al 2013)
From Biological Evolution to Economic Dynamics
How relevant is EIFT for our understanding of evolution?  Cooperation among non-kin is as 
or more important that between kin. For example, symbioses are far more important in biological 
evolution than hitherto recognized (Kiers &  West 2015, Corning & Szathmáry 2015). Theoretical 
evolutionary theory needs to digest this fact. In addition, recent reviews provide ample theoretical and 
empirical evidence justifying the extensions to IFT. For example, Van Cleve and Akcay (2014) 
showed that the interaction between behavioral responses (reciprocity), genetic relatedness, and 
synergy interact are fundamental in understanding the richness of social behavior across taxa. The 
review by Bourke (2014) on "comparative phylogenetic analyses show that cooperative breeding 
and eusociality are promoted by (i) high relatedness and monogamy and, potentially, by (ii) life-
history factors facilitating family structure and high benefits of helping and (iii) ecological factors 
generating low costs of social behavior". The last factor is of course the mirror image of social 
synergy: Environments provide selection pressure to which organisms evolving cooperative 
strategies producing social synergy has to adapt. Many unequivocal examples of  social synergy as 
a factor in determining the evolutionary success of social behavior have been reported. The best 
known example is probably the evolutionary history of social behavior among bees (Michener 
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1969). In the case in wasps, Hamilton's preferred species, social behavior generates indirect benefits
by enhancing the productivity or survivorship of non-kin more often than that of kin (Strassmann et 
al. 1991, Itô 1993, Gadagkar & Gadagkar 2009, Jaffe & Silva 2002, for example).
Biologists are not the only ones interested in social evolution. The features that influence the
dynamics of cooperation have been studied using different theoretical frameworks with different 
specific assumptions. The theoretical framework of studies of social dynamics by biologists, 
sociologists, economists, physicists, mathematicians, game theorists, computer scientists, and 
others, differ in the concepts they use despite the fact that all are studying the same basic 
phenomena, making interdisciplinary communication of this issues difficult.  However, all these 
disciplines have used applications of game theory, and specifically the Prisoner’s Dilemma, to 
pursue their quest for answers in their fields.  Thus, a common language bridging the concepts 
between these disciplines seems possible.
An important difference between biology and economy is that biology focuses on genetic 
evolution whereas economy studies cultural processes. This difference is much less important tan 
the homologies in dynamic processes. For example, Manfred Eigen (1971) insists that Darwinian 
evolution is not merely the organizing principle of biology but a law of physics that should be 
responsible for many phenomena in nature. Genetic evolution is based on vertical transmission of 
information, from parents to offspring, whereas cultural transmission includes in addition to the 
vertical kind a horizontal transmission of information. The overall evolutionary dynamics of both 
processes, however indistinguishably (Jaffe & Cipriani 2007). Both processes produce a continuous 
dynamics that may induce divergence or specialization (Jaffe et al. 2014). 
The evolutionary dynamics in biology is centered on genes and organisms, whereas the 
economic dynamics is centered on business, enterprises and companies. In biology, mating or 
cooperation between the sexes is fundamental for the survival of the population; whereas in 
economy it is cooperation among different type of laborers or companies that allows production of 
wealth. In both cases, the dynamics driving information, innovation and social synergy is similar. 
EIFT formulas the equation: c  <  r . b  using  r = f(a,e)  or a function of the probability of the 
individual to posses a gene that confers it advantages in social interactions with others and the 
social synergy triggered by this interaction. In the case where the socially advantageous gene is 
shared between interacting organisms, we speak of assortation. If f(a,e) has evolved by natural 
selection, economic utility functions are expected to include these same factors. Any comprehensive
utility function in economics then has to include besides direct benefit/cost considerations, benefits 
to kin and group members, to individuals which might reciprocate positively in the future, and any 
entity that might synergize the individual actions. That is the utility function (u), analogously to the 
fitness function defined above, has to have at least three different components: u = f(i, a, e).
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Benefits of an Extended Inclusive Fitness Theory?
The challenge of EIFT is to explain in more detail how biological and economic systems 
produce synergies by favoring specialization and division of labor, conferring the individuals in a 
cooperative society with fitness benefits that are much higher compared to a solitary life (see Jaffe 
2015 for example). More experimental approaches in economics are required to address these issues 
(see Tollefson 2015 for example) . 
EIFT considers that factors other than genetic relatedness affect the cost benefit balance of 
cooperation and that fitness functions and utility function have to consider the direct effects on the 
individual as well as indirect benefits an individual achieves through assortation and synergistic 
interactions. These factors have been studied with different emphasis by biologist and economist. 
The most important factor often overlooked so far is probably the social synergy that emerge from 
cooperative interactions, such as synchronized division of labor.  An important conclusion from 
empirical studies in economics, that try to assess the effect of  social synergy or economic benefits 
that derive from social life, is that synergy is probably the most important driver in the evolution of 
cooperation, and that assortation or genetic relatedness are neither necessary nor sufficient for the 
emergence of cooperative phenomena (see also Corning 2013 ). The same conclusion is reached 
when exploring the dynamics of cooperation in the repeated prisoners dilemma game (Montoreano 
& Jaffe 2013). Here social synergy is more important than assortation, which in turn is more 
important than kin selection, in fomenting cooperation. This suggests that an expanded version of 
IFT is required for a better understanding of the dynamics. Focusing only on kin selection is not 
enough. An insight into the economics of the cooperation is fundamental in understanding it. 
However, little quantitative empirical research on social synergy has been produced in biology (but 
see Osborne & Jaffe 1997, Jaffe 2010, Smith et al. 2010), though it is recognized as of primary 
importance in the economics and business literature. The latest reviews of the empirical literature in
biology, confirm that a more economic view explains the descriptions of societies found in nature 
better (Van Cleve & Akcay 2014; Bourke 2014). Even on co-evolution, the review by Ivens (2014) 
shows a pattern among farming mutualism of ants and their domesticated species that seems to 
produce stability of these successful mutualisms: The component of inclusive fitness in the 
evolutionary dynamics (Figure 1) dwarfs the sexual selection component. Most of these mutalisms 
are characterized by reduced symbiont dispersal and diversity (often in association with asexual 
reproduction and vertical transmission), promoted by specific ant behaviors of the ants, such as 
creation of protective environments. Coevolution, viewed in this new light (see Dawkins & Krebs 
1979, Jaffe & Osborn 2004, Zaman et al. 2014, for example), can easily explain many symbioses. 
Even extravagant proposals such as the one stating that host-microbe interactions influence brain 
13
evolution and development in mammals (Stilling et al. 2014), can now be explained. An EIFT 
makes it unnecessary to treat symbioses and social cooperation as different phenomena as done by 
Corning (2013), as both are considered in o = f(a, e). 
The central insight from recent empirical studies is that economic factors and assortation in 
its different forms determine social behavior. Social behavior cannot be understood without taking 
account of all of them.  A synergistic interchange of theoretical knowledge between economics and 
biology looks promising for a novel attempted to deepen our understanding of social dynamics and 
should help to bridge the gaps in studies of evolution of social cooperation between economist, 
physicists, biologists, and others, providing for a common language in the quantitative assessment 
of the importance of specific features that aid social evolution. 
A theory that helps us to look for the relevant features in the evolution of social behavior, 
dynamics of cooperation and evolution of society might be useful. That is, more important than kin 
relationships are assortation and social synergy for understating social cooperation. Assortation is 
important in a number of fundamental instances of human cooperation (Jaffe 2002b, 2008, Weisel & 
Shalvi 2015) and may emerge in many other circumstances if we look for it. The most relevant 
potential contribution of this theory is that it might allow social science to profit from both 
economics and biology. It might help develop complexity sciences aiming to improve our 
understanding of social synergies unleashed by cooperation are of the fundamental forces driving 
the evolution of societies. These phenomena should be empirically observable. Three examples 
might help convince the reader about the empirical usefulness of this theory. 
1- Many butterflies have associations with ants. They can either be mutualistic, exploitative or 
parasitic. Quantitative phylogenetic analysis revealed a large prevalence of cooperation over
competition in the symbiotic relationship (Osborn & Jaffe 1997). As no possibility of 
genetic flow between ants and butterflies exist, there is no doubt here that social synergy is 
the driving force for cooperation. An impressive large number of symbioses are known to 
exist (Corning 1983, 2013).  This unified treatment of social synergy can be expanded to 
address the spontaneous commerce and cooperation networks that arise from the working of 
competitive advantages between nations (Porter 2011) and firms (Grant 1991) in economics,
as originally conceived by David Ricardo (1891).
2- Empirical evidence shows that different forms of division of productive activities in an 
economy accounts for differences in its capacity to produce and accumulate wealth 
(Hausmann & Hidalgo 2014). This is linked to division of intellectual labor (Jaffe et al. 
2010) in contemporary human society. For example, the division of labor in academic 
research accounts better for differences in relative economic success among nations than any
other variable studied so far (Jaffe et al. 2013a,b). These examples show that arrangements 
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that affect social synergies, such as division of labor, are the key to understand 
contemporary economic development, including the working of finance (Jaffe & Levy-
Carciente 2004). An EIFT stimulates the exchange of analytical tools between economists 
and biologists for a novel view of the working of division of labor (Jaffe 2014b, for 
example).
3- From a biological point of view, division of labor in ants is related to increased economic 
gains of social behavior (Jaffe & Hebling-Beraldo 1993) and at the same time, more 
sophisticated social behavior is related to a decreased individual complexity (Jaffe & Perez 
1989). This is an example of social synergy driving social evolution at the expense of 
individual selection, easily explainable with the EIFT. In economics, we accept that societies
confer energetic benefits to all individuals involved in both ants and humans (Jaffe 2010, 
Bettencourt 2013). Thus cities allow synergies to emerge that provide non-linear benefits to 
society (Haken & Portugali 2003, Florida 2005). This synergies are practically everywhere 
(Corning 1983) and can even be detected in basic physical architectural arrangements 
(Fuller 1975) and therefore might be present in many as jet unsubscribed situations (Haken 
1973). An EIFT might be better able to develop analytical tools to understand how and why 
synergies emerge from division of labor (Jaffe 2014a).
4- The general utility function proposed here, that aims to maximize individual benefits 
directly and indirectly through assortation and synergistic interactions, has molded instincts 
and behavior in all extant plants and animals, including humans, as it is the product of 
natural selection. It explains features of modern life that has escaped explanations by 
classical economic theory. Terrorism for example is a feature that is ever more important in 
contemporary society. Motivations to commit terrorist acts, however, are driven by 
biological and economic stimuli. The branch of biology studying animal and human 
behavior, ethology, tells us that aggression enhances group cohesion, that poor odds of 
survival or of alternative routes to increase ones fitness (or utility) function increase the 
likelihood of aggressive interactions, and that differences in individual strength or low odds 
of retaliation favor aggression (Lorenz 1963, Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1979). That is, the consequences
of a behavioral action can be assessed by the ratio of benefits (b) to costs (c). If  b/c  is high, 
biological and economic evolution will favor this behavior. As recognized by ethologists, 
sometimes b tends to infinity allowing for the existence of supernormal stimuli (Tinbergen & 
Perdeck 1950, Mirás et al. 2007). Religion favors such a hyper-stimulus as shown by 
simulations (Jaffe & Zabala 2009, 2010). When pursuing heavens, or avoiding hell, benefits 
tend to infinity. Thus any action which guarantees heaven or immortality, maximizing the 
individuals utility function, will be favored, even if it implies self-immolation. This 
motivations, together with technological means that allow a single individual to inflict harm 
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to many people, and to pass on virtual or real benefits to a much larger number of 
individuals belonging to his/her natural group, allow terrorism to proper, regardless if it is 
based on religious beliefs or not.
These examples show how a unified view of the dynamics governing cooperation might help
achieving a better understanding between biology, sociology, economy, complex system sciences 
among others, eventually unleashing synergies that might advance our understanding of nature in 
important ways. Low hanging fruits might be found by economist exploring the working of 
assortation, which might improve our scant understanding of the interactions between family and 
business (The Economist, 2015).  Homophily in human society achieves less diverse but more 
harmonious economies (Wang & Steiner 2015), suggesting a role for assortation hitherto 
overlooked in economics. Assortation, viewed in the light of the present theory might, for example, 
explain the ubiquity of corruption among human societies, and help biologists to better understand 
economic synergies found in the social phenomena they study, opening our interdisciplinary world 
view in a consilient way.
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